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Abstract 
 
In common language, education is mostly understood as teaching. In this 
article, I would like to employ the hermeneutical philosophy of Merleau-Ponty 
to draw attention on that other etymological background of education: 
educere. Education as educere is about liberating or displacing our view 
instead of achieving a liberated view. In this sense, education does not refer 
to an immaterial relation of knowing or mastering (Erklären), but to a 
relation of being (Verstehen). I hope to demonstrate Merleau-Ponty's 
philosophy of the body can make us attentive to the importance of this 
hermeneutical and praxical character of education. After all, his thinking 
very aptly describes our relation to the world in terms of a corporeal being 
rather than in terms of a cognitive or abstract knowing. His conception of 
corporeality and of our being to the world (être-au-monde) deconstructs a 
mere formal and all too immaterial account of education. 
 
Keywords:  education, hermeneutics, Merleau-Ponty, Bildung, praxis, 
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Introduction 
 
A general idea of education understands its main object 
mostly in the sense of “formation”. Albeit not easily traceable, 
in contemporary society the idea at least deludes to have roots 
in the hopes of the Enlightenment: man's emergence from his 
self-incurred immaturity.1 In this sense, education refers to the 
empowerment or emancipation of people. It signifies the 
possibility to cultivate a full-grown, critical and liberated 
perspective on the world that allows a better or more correct 
understanding. In a society that focuses heavily on professional META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – IV (2) / 2012 
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skills and on delivering results, the idea of empowerment 
summarizes the common conception of education. To be 
educated today means: to acquire or to be taught the adequate 
set of skills and views (Masschelein 1991). Such understanding 
of education will be the background of this paper. Its reason is 
simple: education as a form of critical self-fulfilment or self-
actualization is not at all non-problematic however. It all 
depends on the meaning or interpretation of terms like better, 
correct,  critical,  self... Education could easily run the risk of 
transforming into an ideal in which the focus foremost lies on 
the realisation of a specific form, rather than on the praxis of its 
process. Such formal education – education towards a certain 
form – is by principle geared to getting results and focuses too 
much on the theoretical or ideal conditions of its action. It 
focuses on an instrumentality and functionality of education. It 
seems that it becomes nearly impossible to think about 
education nowadays without answering the question what ends 
it serves (Elias and Vanwing 2002; Masschelein 1991). In 
addition, in our contemporary society there still seems to be an 
excessive emphasis on the primacy of the cogito (O’Loughlin 
1997). As a consequence, education is principally aimed at a 
certain (and not just any) conceptual and metaphysical reality. 
It is all about a certain evolution of our consciousness. We 
should be cautious about this hidden instrumental and mere 
functional or disciplining characteristic of education. This is 
why, in this article, I would like to employ the hermeneutical 
philosophy of Merleau-Ponty to draw attention on that other 
etymological background of education: educere. As recent theory 
argues, education as educere (“to lead out” or “to reach out”) “is 
not about arriving at a liberated or critical view, but about 
liberating or displacing our view” (Masschelein 2010, 44). What 
is important here is not so much the formal or instrumental 
scope of education, but precisely its lack of an objective or ideal. 
As a praxis, it is value in itself. In this sense, education does 
not refer to an immaterial relation of knowing or mastering 
(Erklären), but to a relation of being (Verstehen).2 It is in this 
way that education becomes contrasted with training, 
formation or disciplining. Education is precisely the process 
that un-folds, displaces or impels ourselves without reference to Pieter Meurs / Education as Praxis: A Corporeal Hermeneutical Account 
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a form or goal. It is the reality – or even better: realization – of 
the myth of self-fulfilment; the hermeneutical version of the 
Socratic adagio “Know Thyself” (understand yourself). To be 
educated does not refer to a mental achievement or a specific 
highlight in our consciousness, but indicates an engaged 
mutuality with the world and being. I hope to demonstrate that 
Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of the body can make us attentive 
to the importance of this hermeneutical and praxical character 
of education. After all, his thinking very aptly describes our 
relation to the world in terms of a corporeal being rather than 
in terms of a cognitive or abstract knowing. His conception of 
corporeality and of our being to the world (être-au-monde) 
deconstructs a mere formal and all too immaterial account of 
education. 
 
(Self-)knowledge, ambiguity and the body 
 
In  La Phénoménologie de la perception Merleau-Ponty 
pinpoints the weaknesses of the two most important modes of 
thinking at that time (but maybe they still are?): empiricism 
and intellectualism (Merleau-Ponty 1945).3 They both presume 
the possibility of objectivity, respectively that of the world or 
that of its perspective: “both keep their distance in relation to 
perception, instead of sticking closely to it” (Merleau-Ponty 
2002, 30; 1945, 34). According to Merleau-Ponty both have lost 
an innocent contact with the world: some sort of primordial, 
empty but already determinate intention (l'attention) (Merleau-
Ponty 1945, 36). There is an existential understanding situated 
on a pre-reflexive level. This non-thetic consciousness doesn't 
have a defined idea of its objects. With this, Merleau-Ponty 
directly criticizes the Cartesian idea – which is still present in 
contemporary society – that we have access to reality by means 
of a clear and distinct cogito. He argues, “to revert with 
Descartes from things to thought about things is to take one of 
two courses: it is either to reduce experience to a collection of 
psychological events, of which the I is merely the overall name 
or the hypothetical cause, in which case it is not clear how my 
existence is more certain that that of any thing, since it is no 
longer immediate, save at a fleeting instant; or else it is to META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – IV (2) / 2012 
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recognize as anterior to events a field and a system of thought 
which is subject neither to time nor to any other limitation, a 
mode of existence owing nothing to the event and which is 
existence as consciousness, a spiritual act which grasps at a 
distance and compresses into itself everything at which it aims, 
an “I think” which is, by itself and without any adjunct, an “I 
am” (Merleau-Ponty 1945, 426). 
Although Merleau-Ponty concurs with Descartes on the 
fact that it is undoubtedly so that “I think”, he believes the latter 
goes too far when he reduces the whole of being to thinking. 
According to Merleau-Ponty, “the acts of the I are of such a 
nature that they outstrip themselves leaving no interiority of 
consciousness” (Merleau-Ponty 2002, 438; 1945, 431). 
Consciousness is not in and for itself. It is no subject that places 
itself outside the world. The “I” does not see or cannot grasp “my” 
whole reality or existence: “it is not because I think I am that I 
am certain of my existence: on the contrary, the certainty I enjoy 
concerning my thought stems from their genuine existence” 
(Merleau-Ponty 2002, 445; 1945, 438). Thinking is a consequence 
of existence rather than its foundation. Moreover, since existence 
is not simply reducible to consciousness, “I” is – or I am – first of 
all ambiguously. Being shows itself to us in ambiguity.4 Being 
and beings are not given to us by way of a clear and distinct idea. 
Indeed, they are given to us, they are already there, but before 
every idea we can have about them. But this means nothing 
other than the fact that we are always already immersed in 
something: we are always already toward the world. It implies 
that we cannot pretend to be absolutely outside of something – or 
to be absolute: ab-solute, a being that is detached. There always 
already (déjà-là) is a “direct and primitive contact with the 
world” (Merleau-Ponty 2002, vii; 1945, i). 
In La Phénoménologie Merleau-Ponty discovers the body 
as the vehicle of this originary and ambiguous relation to the 
world. Through the body “I am at grips with the world” 
(Merleau-Ponty 2002, 353; 1945, 349). Neither the body, nor the 
world are conceived as an object, but are expose our most 
original experience and direct preconscious approach to or 
touching of the world. It is through the body that we encounter 
the world. It is our engagement and involvement. The body Pieter Meurs / Education as Praxis: A Corporeal Hermeneutical Account 
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indicates our being-to-the-world. In this sense, our contact with 
the world and being is first and foremost a je peux, instead of a 
je pense. The emphasis shifts from a detached, thinking cogito 
to an engaged embodiment. According to Merleau-Ponty our 
body is not simply an object: “in order that we may be able to 
move our body towards an object, the object must first exist for 
it, our body must not belong to the real of the ‘in-itself’” 
(Merleau-Ponty 2002, 161). Our body is intended towards the 
world. It is not simply “in” the world and time, but is “towards” 
them: “it inhabits space and time” (Merleau-Ponty 2002, 161; 
1945, 164). Our body embodies the world. As such, the body for 
Merleau-Ponty is not to be considered as a mere object. It is 
that what carries us into existence; it is that what makes us 
exist. In this sense, a body is not something I can have. It is not 
something outside of my thought. It would be more adequate to 
say: “I am in it, or rather I am it” (Merleau-Ponty 2002, 173; 
1945, 175). As such, Merleau-Ponty completely retraces the 
conditions and limits of what we generally understand by mind 
and body. Indeed, he argues consciousness is not something 
outside our corporeal being: “our body is not an object for an “I 
think”, it is a grouping of lived-through meanings which moves 
towards its equilibrium” (Merleau-Ponty 2002, 177; 1945, 179). 
One of Merleau-Ponty’s commentators aptly summarizes that 
there is “a creative power in the body to which we fail to do 
justice when we persist in seeing it as the handmaiden of 
consciousness, or when we ignore the body's intelligent 
connections with the world at hand in order to draw attention 
to the linguistic construction of social structures and the 
symbolic features attached to ‘subject positions’ within 
discourse” (O’Loughlin 1997, 24-25). 
From this follows that human action is a field that 
incorporates or embodies subject and object and that its source 
cannot be reduced to conscious autonomous motives. The source 
isn't hidden somewhere behind the action, but comes into being 
in the interplay itself: through the body. Merleau-Ponty argues 
it is not possible to grasp reality in a dualism of subject and 
object and as such our primary encounter with the world is 
everything but objective. The intertwining of body and world, of 
subject and object, puts an end to the centrality of the subject META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – IV (2) / 2012 
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and to the objectivity of consciousness and brings corporeality 
to the fore.  
 
Self-actualization 
 
This has far-reaching implications for our thinking of 
education: the Socratic command to know ourselves is always 
already marked by a deficit. According to Merleau-Ponty, the 
pursuit of self-knowledge only results in an anonymous flux (un 
flux anonyme): “everything that I ‘am’ in virtue of nature or 
history – hunchbacked, handsome or Jewish – I never am these 
things totally for and in myself” (Merleau-Ponty 1945, 497, my 
translation). To know ourselves is not characterized by 
objectivity or abstraction. Its knowledge is situated, embedded 
in a certain intentional context that refers to the relation 
between my body and the world. Indeed, knowledge is not 
something to be mastered, “it is always felt and responded to 
somatically; that is, in its corporeal materiality” (O’Loughlin 
1997, 29). In other words: as far as my body touches and 
understands the world around me, I find myself in a field that 
has not completely risen from my conscious or mental decisions: 
I know myself to be an individual not because I know of the 
being of this individual, but because I already am this 
individual. It is this intrinsic and primordial corporeal relation 
between myself and being – and not some abstract or absolute 
cogito – that forms the basis of my knowledge. My 
consciousness or my ‘knowing’, then, is not the straightforward 
instigator of my knowledge and as such cannot deliver me an 
objective and unambiguous perspective. What matters is the 
error of a mode of thinking that only considers intellectual 
objects and ignores the existential design that is its foundation. 
There exists an unspannable chasm between a subject that is to 
be known and an existential subject that knows. Therefore, 
reality is never objective or absolute, but becomes real through 
its corporeality.  
With his primacy of the body Merleau-Ponty criticizes 
the possibility of an absolute subject and of objective 
knowledge. He does not consider the subject to be the ground or 
essence of being: my so-called subjectivity is nothing other than Pieter Meurs / Education as Praxis: A Corporeal Hermeneutical Account 
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an abstract notion of myself, a deceptive mode of being. I only 
know myself through ambiguity. This means my life must have 
a sense or meaning that is not solely given by me.  Merleau-
Ponty speaks of intersubjectivity rather than of subjectivity. 
There is no such thing as an I or subject that is independent or 
abstract of a world. They are gleichursprünglich, Heidegger 
would say. This is why Merleau-Ponty speaks of being as being-
to-the-world (être-au-monde). They are always already 
interconnected. With the impossibility of objective knowledge, 
our being-to-the-world generates some sort of double blind. Self-
knowledge or a sense of ourselves is not something that can be 
achieved, and can be nothing other than “the concrete project of 
a future which is elaborated within social coexistence and in the 
One [l'On] before any personal decision is made” (Merleau-
Ponty 2002, 522; 1945, 513). We only know being in so far as 
being gives us this knowledge. And this being is first of all 
corporal. In order to know ourselves, Merleau-Ponty figures the 
individual is left amidst a zone of general existence. This 
generality is a consciousness or a presence towards itself, the 
other and the world. It is and cannot be however an absolute 
presence or objective and direct contact with itself. As such, the 
idea of education as the pursuit of self-knowledge or self-
actualization by means of mere individual or subjective 
consciousness loses its continuity. Rather, the emphasis shifts 
towards the corporeal involvement with the world. What does it 
mean that the body is our primary contact with the world? As 
we will see, this opens up the possibility for a lived 
understanding: not an explanation of reality, but a reaching or 
touching of the world; an existential understanding that is 
situated on a corporeal level.  
 
Corporeal education; education as praxis 
 
The key question is what is to be understood. For 
Merleau-Ponty it’s not about the understanding or interpreting 
of the actuality of this pre-reflexive way of being in the world. 
The body is not simply the subject of his hermeneutical 
endeavour. The centrality of Merleau-Pontian hermeneutics 
doesn’t look for the understanding of a latent concealed META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – IV (2) / 2012 
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meaning or sense of preconscious intentions, but supposes that 
this pre-reflexivity sets the borders of meaning and 
meaningfulness. The ambiguity and the pre-reflexivity are not 
the objects to be analysed or revealed, but merely give the 
structures and boundaries from which reality gets its sense and 
meaning. A theory of interpretation according to Merleau-Ponty 
goes beyond the scope of the traditional hermeneutical search 
for truth, meaning and identity. The surplus value of a 
Merleau-Pontian hermeneutics in the context of education is 
not to be found in the fulfilment or knowledge of some sort of 
Self, but rather in what I call a differentiated situatedness. 
Somehow badly chosen words, I agree, but they refer to what 
Merleau-Ponty calls l’écart – differentiation, spacing, 
separation. According to him, it is first of all this separation 
that “is the perceptual sense” (Merleau-Ponty 1964a, 250). It is 
not the thing in itself – the self – that makes up its sense, but 
rather its difference from what it is not, from its context. 
According to Merleau-Ponty, it is spacing or separation that 
marks things and as such their necessary relation. Separation 
points to the difference between things that emerges through 
the mutual relation they have with each other. As a 
consequence, a Merleau-Pontian hermeneutics should not focus 
on the formality or ipseity of a certain Self that needs to be 
actualized or known, but on the acknowledgement of the being-
in-the-world, the acknowledgement of the difference or spacing 
in that corporeal situatedness. This difference only becomes 
clear when we realize the relation with the world and the other, 
that is: in the lived world (le monde vécu).  
What is important for a hermeneutics of education is the 
idea that we find ourselves always already in a field of meaning 
and that therefore we're not able to protrude to an 
epistemological certainty. Merleau-Ponty speaks of “a vigilance 
that doesn't let us forget the ground of all knowing” (Merleau-
Ponty 1960, 138, my translation). This might be a correct 
description of the ambiguity that indicates the flaws and 
deficiencies inherent to all meaning and understanding. With 
the emphasis on ambiguity, Merleau-Ponty denies the ideal of 
essence and shifts the focus to the boundaries of knowing and of 
meaning. Hermeneutics in that way is nothing more than Pieter Meurs / Education as Praxis: A Corporeal Hermeneutical Account 
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understanding or interpreting the embodied subject in the lived 
world: it is being-to-the-world as a possibility an sich. It is not a 
procedure located in an interior space called “the mind”.5 
Meaning is not meaning for an objective understanding, but 
rather a structure that is open and embodied. Merleau-Ponty 
considers the body as expression and understanding of the 
world. Emphasizing on this expressional characteristics of 
existence, he speaks on human existence metaphorically: he 
sees existence as a talking subject (un sujet parlant), rather 
than a thinking subject (un sujet pensant). On the one hand, it 
means there is a meaning-creating subjectivity in the speech of 
men. On the other, Merleau-Ponty states that the subject can't 
transcend language: the subject only lives in its speech. There 
is no Archimedean point beyond language, beyond the body and 
the world. It becomes in its existence, in the intertwining 
between body and world. This becoming, the speech and actual 
acting contrast a concept of thinking that carries within itself 
ideas, concepts and categories that proceed their actual 
realization. As for meaning, the same principle applies: its 
actual signification emerges through the lived world. Existence 
is corporeal. It does not have a body, it is embodied. Thereby, 
the emphasis is not on that abstract or ideal concept that is 
expressed, but on what expresses. It is in this sense I want to 
speak about the praxis of education. What is important, is not 
so much the formal aspects of education or the ideas behind it. 
Education is not simply a mental or immaterial evolution. Its 
process exists – or takes place – throughout our embodied 
being-to-the-world. Indeed, what matters, “is what is felt 
knowledge, knowledge as “lived engagement” (O’Loughlin 1997, 
29). As such, education first and foremost does not refer to 
something outside its praxis. It is nothing other than a 
corporeal hermeneutical experience. From a Merleau-Pontian 
perspective, education as self-actualization or self-fulfilment is 
no search for a Self or its knowledge, but refers to an 
understanding of a being that always already is situated and 
corporeal. This implies a rejection of the coincidence of an 
educated consciousness and a view of the world. It means 
education only happens to-the-world and primarily is no 
achievement of the mind but a bodily experience. META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – IV (2) / 2012 
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Education as an art of corporeal understanding 
 
As already stated, education should not simply be 
understood as the possibility of an individual that can lift itself 
to the subject of its actions. It does not merely refer to training, 
disciplining or formation. There is no objective knowledge or 
actualization that is the pinnacle of its evolution. What matters 
is its process, which is a corporeal praxis. This can be aptly 
understood by Merleau-Ponty’s nuance of consciousness: 
“consciousness is in the first place not a matter of ‘I think that’, 
but of ‘I can’” (Merleau-Ponty 2002, 529; 1945, 160). It indicates 
its corporeal and involved character. In this sense, education is 
not something to has to be achieved, but accomplishes itself 
throughout its praxis. This is similar to the way Merleau-Ponty 
describes the painter in L’Oeil et l’Esprit (Merleau-Ponty 
1964b).6 In this work he describes the relation between the art 
of painting (the eye) and philosophy (the mind). Again the body 
has a key role to play. It refers to a synergy between seeing and 
moving. The visible here implies corporeality: it is truly the 
possibility to be in the world.  
According to Merleau-Ponty, the painter can only paint 
through his body. In this way, the visible and the body are 
interconnected. Which also means the visible is connected with 
the one who sees. Viewer and visible are one, there is no 
separation between subject and object. For Merleau-Ponty, the 
view of the painter is intertwined with the visible: inside and 
outside criss-cross each other. This is different from a camera 
that registers images. “The world is no longer before him [the 
painter] through representation: it rather is the painter who is 
born within the things” (Merleau-Ponty 1964b, 69). Merleau-
Ponty argues the painter does not look at a painting but that he 
rather views through or by means of a painting. What matters 
is not the necessity to capture or to picture reality. What is 
important is the emergence of other views and visibilities. The 
painter offers much more than a picture of the world. The 
painting is no copy. It does not relate to reality like a picture to 
its original. The painter does not represent reality, but alters it. 
It is in this sense art shows us things outside traditional Pieter Meurs / Education as Praxis: A Corporeal Hermeneutical Account 
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reality. Art is about a discovery of the world, about making the 
invisible visible.  
The art of painting is about the limits of the visible and 
the invisible. With this, Merleau-Ponty pinpoints an important 
educational aspect: to perceive the world differently, by means of 
other realities. The difference between the visible and the 
invisible, essence and existence, fades through the act of the 
painter and this teaches us to see the limits of our individual 
perspectives. This reveals the true meaning of a view through a 
painting: painting is equal to creation. A view is not simply a 
representation, but always already shows much more than itself. 
It is the very act of actualization. An example: our view of a 
space cannot merely be understood as a grid of relations between 
objects or as geometrical proportions or scales. It rather is the 
space where our view takes place: its lives through this space. 
According to Merleau-Ponty we shouldn't just speak about space 
or light, but we should “let speak the space and light that are 
there” (Merleau-Ponty 1964b, 59). It is in this sense that space 
and the visible always express a certain potential.  
It is this potential the artist uses. He does not start from 
a blueprint, but makes the world speak for itself. The world and 
the body are no instruments, but they are preconditions. The 
artist does not work with his body or the world, but through 
them. In the context of education, the metaphor of art shows to 
be a useful model. It refers to the work of art that life is. There 
are no goals to be achieved, no Self to be actualized, known or 
fulfilled. As hermeneutics, it reminds us that there can be no 
objective claim of reality and that education does not refer to 
some sort of significant culmination or apotheosis, but that it is 
all about the displacement of significance and perspectives.  
If education has a liberating power, this is not to be 
found in the liberty it releases or establishes, but in the 
possibility to focus onto something else. In this context 
Merleau-Ponty refers to the ability (pouvoir) to break with the 
previous or to commit to the other: “I can break every form, I 
can laugh with everything, there is no such case in which I am 
entirely absorbed: this is not because I retire in my liberty, but 
because I engage with something else” (Merleau-Ponty 1945, 
516, my translation). The educational power of the artist is META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – IV (2) / 2012 
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there, not because he starts from a complete liberated view, but 
because he liberates in seeing things differently. The 
educational aspect of a corporeal hermeneutics is thus not 
situated in an evolution of consciousness. It presents us our 
corporeality, our expression or exposition. In this sense, 
education means nothing other than educere: that praxis that 
opens or breaks up, exposes, reaches out, expresses...  
 
The practice of education 
 
As a final remark, I would like to concisely indicate what 
the above means for the educational practice. With an emphasis 
on the praxis, education loses its focus on all too rigid action 
schemes or methodologies. Indeed, it rather asks for some kind 
of poor pedagogy, as recent research would argue (Masschelein 
2010). What matters most for our understanding of education is 
the idea of coexistence. It refers to intersubjectivity and the 
impossibility of absoluteness or objectivity. Education always 
already presupposes the other (another ‘educated’ me, a 
teacher, the world…). For Merleau-Ponty there is always 
already some sort of being of two, a dual being (être à deux): 
“where the other is for me no longer a mere bit of behaviour 
[comportement] in my transcendental field, nor I in his; we are 
collaborators for each other in consummate reciprocity. Our 
perspectives merge into each other, and we coexist through a 
common world” (Merleau-Ponty 2002, 413; 1945, 407). It means 
the individual cannot conceive itself without the other or 
without the world. There always is some kind of interworld 
(l'intermonde) in which the encounter of two individuals implies 
their worlds merge. The interworld is a corporeal common 
world. It emphasizes that any individual is never just 
individual – it’s rather dividual. There are always already 
multiple meanings and identities that cannot be considered 
independent or abstract from the situation. In the context of the 
educational practice, the idea of coexistence indicates the 
importance of involvement and engagement. That, rather than 
theoretical methodologies and models, is what is primordial for 
the practice of education. 
 Pieter Meurs / Education as Praxis: A Corporeal Hermeneutical Account 
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NOTES 
 
 
1 Surely, this is a reference to Kant who with his essay Beantwortung der 
Frage: Was ist Aufklärung of 1784 still can be seen as an enormous 
inspiration for the philosophy of education. 
2 With Merleau-Ponty I do indeed consider hermeneutics on an ontological 
level. For considerations on this issue see Dillon (1988). For a theoretical 
approach of ontological hermeneutics see Gadamer (2006). 
3 For quotations, I use the English translation of La phénoménologie by Colin 
Smith (2002). All translations are his, unless otherwise stated. 
4 It is De Whaelens (1951) who aptly describes this rudiment of Merleau-
Ponty's philosophy. 
5 See Busch and Gallagher (1992) for an extensive reflection on Merleau-
Ponty and Hermeneutics. 
6 All translations are my own. 
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